Table Of Content
Sufficient blackstart resources, located in specific locations within each interconnection, are the last line of defense against a prolonged blackout. In an earlier blog,[1] I discussed the need to create a Design Basis Threat (“DBT”) for blackstart in the face of new and emerging threats, and then conduct the necessary planning studies to ensure there is sufficient and operable blackstart generation available. In addition, there is a need to include flexible blackstart processes to restart the electric grid following interconnection-wide blackouts. The Design-Basis Threat (DBT) Report is a profile of the type, composition, capabilities, methods (tactics, techniques, and procedures), and the goals, intent, and motivation of an adversary upon which the security engineering and operations of a facility are based. A profile of the type, composition, capabilities, methods (tactics, techniques, and procedures), and the goals, intent, and motivation of an adversary upon which the security engineering and operations of a facility are based.
Group I: Consideration of the 12 Factors in the Energy Policy Act
The NRC will consider using a voluntary consensus standard if an appropriate standard is identified. Design Basis Threats (DBT) and Representative Threat Statements (RTS) are two of the most prominent tools proposed by the updated IAEA guidance. To request access, email with your full name and contact information, including email, agency name, and reason for access.
Public Protection Notification
The determination of this environmental assessment is that there will be no significant off-site impact to the public from this action. 104–113, requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless using such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or is otherwise impractical. The NRC is not aware of any voluntary consensus standard that could be used instead of the proposed Government-unique standards.
Design Basis Threat Development is Key to Proper “Blackstart” Grid Capability
Each plant was requested to consider implementation of applicable additional strategies by August 31, 2005. The NRC inspected each plant in 2005 to review their implementation of any additional mitigative measures. In addition, § 73.1(a)(1)(iii) (the land vehicle bomb provision) is similarly revised to delete the “four-wheel drive” limitation, and to add a capability that the vehicle bomb “may be coordinated with an external assault,” maximizing its destructive potential. Further, an entirely new capability has been added to the DBT involving a waterborne vehicle bomb, which also is encompassed in the coordinated attack concept. This ISC Standard defines the criteria and processes facility security professionals should use in determining a facility's security level. This standard provides an integrated, single source of physical security countermeasures and guidance on countermeasure customization for all nonmilitary federal facilities.
Webinar on National Nuclear Security Threat Assessment, Design Basis Threats and Representative Threat Statements
Three Mile Island Intruder - Union of Concerned Scientists - The Equation
Three Mile Island Intruder - Union of Concerned Scientists.
Posted: Thu, 05 Jul 2018 07:00:00 GMT [source]
The large aircraft impact studies included structural analyses of the aircraft impact into a single cask and the resulting cask-to-cask interactions. Those evaluations indicate that it is highly unlikely that a significant release of radioactivity would occur from an aircraft impact on a dry spent fuel storage cask. Dry cask storage facilities (e.g., independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs)) at nuclear power plants are designed to protect against external events such as tornados, hurricanes, fires, floods, and earthquakes. The standards in 10 CFR Part 72 Subpart E, “Siting Evaluation Factors,” and Subpart F, “General Design Criteria,” ensure that the dry cask storage designs are very rugged and robust. The casks must maintain structural, thermal, shielding, criticality, and confinement integrity during a variety of postulated external events including cask drops, tip-over, and wind driven missile impacts. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the NRC has worked with licensees, the DHS, and State and local governments to improve the capabilities of first responders as part of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
Mystery drones are buzzing around French nuclear plants – should we be worried? - The Conversation
Mystery drones are buzzing around French nuclear plants – should we be worried?.
Posted: Thu, 20 Nov 2014 08:00:00 GMT [source]
A reasonable approach in determining the threat requires making certain assumptions about these shared responsibilities. Although licensees are not required to develop protective strategies to defend against beyond-DBT events, it should not be concluded that licensees can provide no defense against those threats. The NRC has authorized the Duke Energy Corporation, owner and operator of the Catawba plant, to irradiate four fuel assemblies of Mixed-Oxide (MOX) fuel at the Catawba plant on a test basis as part of its license amendment issued on March 3, 2005. MOX fuel technically meets the criteria of a formula quantity of Strategic Special Nuclear Material, in this case plutonium, and would be subject to the DBT provisions of § 73.1(a)(2) for theft or diversion. However, the NRC staff found that MOX fuel is not attractive to potential adversaries from a theft and diversion standpoint at the reactor site due to its low plutonium concentration, composition, and form (size and weight). The MOX fuel consists of plutonium oxide particles dispersed in a ceramic matrix of depleted uranium oxide with a plutonium concentration of less than six weight percent.
Guidance
Establishing such a DBT can provide a valuable planning tool for the Transmission Operators and their partners who are responsible for blackstart operations. In particular, as cyber and other threats to blackstart assets and capabilities continue to intensify, DBTs can help system owners and operators target their investments to maintain system resilience. A formal DBT also can provide regulators confidence that those investments are prudent, and deal with ongoing challenges in the availability of gas-fueled cranking-path generators. One significant change to the rule relates to physical threats from the use of vehicles, either as modes of transportation or as vehicle bombs. Section 73.1(a)(1)(i)(E), for example, effectively expands the scope of vehicles available for the transportation of adversaries by deleting the reference to “four-wheel drive” and by adding water-based vehicles. The competent authorities should regularly review the national threat assessment and the DBTs and revise them as needed.
Resource Materials
The NRC continues to work with DHS and the Nuclear Energy Institute to develop and implement a security-based drill and exercise program at power reactor licensees. Tabletop drills at four power reactor sites and a facility drill were conducted successfully, and areas for improvement were identified and incorporated by the industry into draft guidelines. Over the next three years, the industry plans to conduct security-based EP drills at each power reactor licensee with an end state of the integration of security-based EP scenarios into the biennial EP exercise program. Two other commenters stated that the regulations do not reflect protections against explosive devices of considerable size, other modern weaponry, and cyber, biochemical, and other terrorist threats.
The Commission expects that licensees and State and Federal authorities will use whatever resources are necessary in response to both DBT and beyond-DBT events. The NRC also initiated a program in 2002 to assess the capability of nuclear facilities to withstand a terrorist attack. As the results of that program became available, the NRC provided power reactor licensees additional guidance in February 2005 on the implementation of the February 2002 Order regarding spent fuel mitigation measures. Mitigating measures that are being or have been established include those specifically recommended in the NAS study regarding fuel distribution and enhanced cooling capabilities. Though the following topics and comments are pertinent to the security issues of nuclear facilities, they are not directly relevant to the DBT rulemaking. The DBT rule identifies general threat characteristics, but does not require specific protective strategies and security measures to defend against and thwart attacks.
The NRC sent a copy of the environmental assessment and the proposed rule to every State Liaison Officer and requested their comments on the environmental assessment. RTS, on the other hand, could be used to develop generic, prescriptive regulatory requirements for a particular subset of lower consequence materials or facilities. The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required.
NNSA’s safeguards and security program has multiple areas of deterrence including protective force, physical security, information security, material control and accountability, personnel security, and security program operations and planning. These programs integrate personnel, equipment, and procedures to protect physical assets and resources against theft, sabotage, diversion, and other criminal acts. The national nuclear security threat assessment result is used to develop material-, facility- or activity-specific DBTs. Plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, must comply with fire protection requirements as specified in 10 CFR 50.48(b) that backfit paragraphs III.G, J and O of Appendix R. Plants licensed to operate after January 1, 1979, must comply with the approved fire protection program incorporated into their operating license. When the Commission promulgated 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, the Commission recognized that there would be plant specific conditions and configurations where strict compliance with the prescriptive features specified in Appendix R would not significantly enhance the level of fire safety already provided by the licensee. Other commenters charged that the DBT rulemaking is simply codifying secret orders to avoid public scrutiny.
