Table Of Content
The new CAF has been used for all FOF exercises conducted after October 2004 and represents a significant improvement in ability, consistency, and effectiveness over the previous adversary forces. The final rule deletes the term “individual” to provide flexibility in defining the number of persons who may be involved in providing inside assistance. The award recognizes the contributions the members of the NNSA DBT Implementation team make each day to the nuclear security mission. The team protects some of the country’s most vital strategic assets and information, and through their award-winning work, have significantly influenced the way NNSA assesses risk and thereby made great strides in advancing U.S. national security objectives. In the past, large-scale blackouts on the electric grid have not affected an entire interconnection. Thus, system operators were able to restart generation in the blacked-out areas from external ties.[2] But as we saw from the “near miss” in the February 2021 ERCOT blackout, operators cannot count on outside assistance to restart an interconnection.
XVI. Backfit Analysis
As stated in the response to Group III Comments No. 18 (Security of Dry Cask Storage) and 19 (Security of Spent Fuel Pools), the NRC has required that licensees take additional security and mitigating measures against a radioactive release of spent fuel. In addition to those security-related emergency planning efforts, the NRC and DHS worked together to develop and improve EP for a terrorist attack through federal initiatives such as comprehensive review programs and integrated response planning efforts. The NRC and DHS have enhanced the coordination of integrated EP programs through evaluations of licensee and State/local/tribal response capabilities, and reviews of critical infrastructure preparedness and response plans for commercial nuclear power plants. Our combined efforts have resulted in specific enhancements to security-related EP measures, and continued improvement in capabilities for licensees and off-site response organizations to respond to a wide spectrum of events.
Related publications
One commenter suggested that it was improper for the Commission to share the draft ACDs and RGs with members of the nuclear industry but not members of the general public. The NRC also shared those documents with the States of New Jersey and Illinois that had established a need to know and obtained appropriate clearance. Other NRC stakeholders do not necessarily share this need to know, and therefore, have not been granted access to the classified and SGI ACDs and RGs. The ACDs and RGs are guidance documents containing SGI and classified information, and describe how licensees can comply with the regulations. The APA permits agencies to develop guidance documents like the ACDs and RGs without following notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements (5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A)).
Group I: Consideration of the 12 Factors in the Energy Policy Act
With the expansion of nuclear and radioactive materials in use worldwide, the potential for malicious use of these materials is a growing concern. The IAEA continues to advise national authorities on best practices for nuclear security with a newly updated implementation guide — National Nuclear Security Threat Assessment, Design Basis Threats and Representative Threat Statements. It is part of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series (NSS) and provides guidance on how countries can implement security recommendations based on their nuclear and radioactive facilities and conduct security threat assessments to thwart risks from, inter alia, terrorists, criminals and extremists. This publication provides guidance on how to develop, use and maintain a design basis threat (DBT). It is intended for decision makers from organizations with roles and responsibilities for the development, use and maintenance of the DBT.
Threat based training
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This final rule affects only the licensing and operation of nuclear power plants and Category I fuel cycle facilities. The companies that own these plants do not fall within the scope of the definition of “small entities” set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size standards established by the NRC (10 CFR 2.810). The NRC requires that RTR licensees have security plans and/or procedures that reflect a graded approach which considers the attractiveness of the reactor fuel as a target, and the risk of radiological release. In general, these programs include access control to the facilities, observation of activities within the facilities, and alarms or other devices to detect unauthorized presence.
Identifying Threats in Your Design
Other commenters representing the nuclear industry, while agreeing that the DBT scope must be clear, asserted that the DBT can not be greater than the largest threats against which private sector facilities can reasonably be requested to defend themselves, and threats beyond the DBT are reasonably the responsibility of the national defense system. As discussed above, Section 170E of the AEA, as amended by Section 651(a) of the EPAct, directed the Commission to consider but not be limited to, the 12 factors specified in the statute in the course of the DBT rulemaking. Prior to discussing the substance of the 12 factors, the Commission notes that several commenters charged that the Commission violated Section 170E by not considering some of the 12 factors, and by deferring final consideration of some of the provisions to the final rule. Those commenters suggested that this not only violated the mandate of Section 170E, but also the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by not providing adequate notice of the substance of the rule, and thus, the rule should be withdrawn and re-proposed. With respect to the commenter's statement on the exemptions from certain safety regulations (e.g., Appendix R fire protection standards), the NRC staff believes that the comment is out of scope of this rulemaking.
Will There be Sufficient Blackstart Resources to Recover from a Major Electric Outage? FERC Needs to Get the Facts
Security professionals at Pantex honored - Amarillo Globe-News
Security professionals at Pantex honored.
Posted: Sun, 07 Nov 2021 07:00:00 GMT [source]
Another commenter did not believe the proposed DBTs protected against all conceivable attacks, such as launching a large explosive device from a boat, clogging the water intakes, dropping a conventional bomb into spent fuel pools, insider sabotage, etc. Because the regulatory guides (RGs) and the ACDs are guidance documents that provide details to the licensees regarding implementation and compliance with the DBTs, these documents may be updated from time to time as a result of the NRC's periodic threat reviews. These threat reviews are performed in conjunction with the intelligence and law enforcement communities to identify changes in the threat environment which may, in turn, require adjustments of NRC security requirements. Future revisions to the ACDs would not require changes to the DBT regulations in 10 CFR 73.1, provided the changes remain within the scope of the rule text. The Commission took into account a number of issues and sources in conducting this rulemaking, which included its experience in the implementation of the DBT Orders, the issues raised in PRM–73–12, EPAct requirements, and the public comments on the proposed rule. Additionally, the Commission specifically invited public comments on how these factors should be addressed in the rule.
PART 73—PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
Thus, the airborne threat is one which is beyond what a private security force can reasonably be expected to defend against. Second, licensees have been directed to implement certain mitigative measures to limit the effects of an aircraft strike. Therefore, the Commission has denied the request of the petition PRM–73–12 regarding the inclusion of the airborne threat in the DBTs, as well as beamhenge as physical security measures. More detailed information in support of the Commission's position is provided in the comment resolutions for Factor 6, the potential for water-based and air-based threats, and Factor 9, the potential for fires, especially fires of long duration.
XII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Environmental Assessment: Availability
An e-learning module also exists to give participants a basic overview of nuclear security threats and risks for material and facilities, including topics such as threat assessment and planning; roles and responsibilities; coordinating assessment activities; and threat-based approaches to designing security measures. Using DBT is important because it provides detailed adversary characterizations, taking into account local threats and the specificities of a facility or activity. Such adversaries with the intention to commit sabotage and/or theft include not only external actors, but potentially also those with authorised access to facilities handling nuclear or other radioactive material. Furthermore, a DBT can be used by operators of high-risk facilities and activities to develop attack scenarios and demonstrate the effectiveness of the security systems applied. To conduct a national nuclear security threat assessment, the competent authorities collect and analyse intelligence and other threat information from open sources, past nuclear security events, other security events and other sources. They evaluate the credibility of the threat information, identify potential adversaries and their attributes and characteristics, as well as the likelihood of possible adversary actions.
The analysis should consider whether specific adversary capabilities are relevant to potential targets. The CAF is currently managed by a company (Wackenhut) that provides much of the security for U.S. nuclear power plants and is, therefore, well-versed in the security operations of nuclear power plants. The NRC established a clear separation of functions between the CAF and plant security force to ensure an independent, reliable, and credible mock adversary force. In addition, the CAF composition includes security officers that are not employed by Wackenhut and no member of the CAF may participate in an exercise at his or her home site.
The MOX fuel assemblies are the same form as conventional fuel assemblies designed for a commercial light-water power reactor and are over 12 feet long and weigh approximately 1,500 pounds. A large quantity of MOX fuel and an elaborate extraction process would be required to yield enough material for use in an improvised nuclear device or weapon. On the “attractiveness” bases, the NRC staff found that the complete application of 10 CFR 73.45(d)(1)(iv), 73.46 (C)(1), 73.46(h)(3), 73.46(b)(3)–(b)(12), 73.46(d)(9), and 73.46(e)(3) for MOX fuel was not necessary. The staff therefore approved the exemptions requested to these regulations, finding that they were authorized by law, and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and that are otherwise in the public interest. The Commission later approved this determination in an adjudicatory order issued on June 20, 2005.
The DOE Directives Program in the Office of Management (MA-1.2) oversees the development and maintenance of directives, established as the primary means to set, communicate, and institutionalize policies, requirements, and responsibilities for Department of Energy (DOE) elements and contractors. Directives facilitate the achievement of DOE's strategic and operational goals, while ensuring safe, secure, efficient, cost-effective operations and compliance with applicable legal requirements. Although the DBT does not go into specifics on the impacts of natural hazards, the mitigation of risk is typically addressed within applicable construction and life safety standards. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.
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